surrealist manifesto André Bretón 2/4

I am in no mood to admit that the mind is interested in occupying  itself with such matters, even fleetingly. It may be argued that this  school-boy description has its place, and that at this juncture of the  book the author has his reasons for burdening me. Nevertheless he is  wasting his time, for I refuse to go into his room. Others’ laziness or  fatigue does not interest me. I have too unstable a notion of the  continuity of life to equate or compare my moments of depression or  weakness with my best moments. When one ceases to feel, I am of the  opinion one should keep quiet. And I would like it understood that I am  not accusing or condemning lack of originality as such. I am only saying  that I do not take particular note of the empty moments of my life,  that it may be unworthy for any man to crystallize those which seem to  him to be so. I shall, with your permission, ignore the description of  that room, and many more like it. 
Not so fast, there; I’m getting into the area of psychology, a subject about which I shall be careful not to joke. 
The author attacks a character and, this being settled upon,  parades his hero to and fro across the world. No matter what happens,  this hero, whose actions and reactions are admirably predictable, is  compelled not to thwart or upset -- even though he looks as though he is  -- the calculations of which he is the object. The currents of life can  appear to lift him up, roll him over, cast him down, he will still  belong to this readymade human type. A simple game of chess which  doesn't interest me in the least -- man, whoever he may be, being for me  a mediocre opponent. What I cannot bear are those wretched discussions  relative to such and such a move, since winning or losing is not in  question. And if the game is not worth the candle, if objective reason  does a frightful job -- as indeed it does -- of serving him who calls  upon it, is it not fitting and proper to avoid all contact with these  categories? "Diversity is so vast that every different tone of voice,  every step, cough, every wipe of the nose, every sneeze...."* (Pascal.)  If in a cluster of grapes there are no two alike, why do you want me to  describe this grape by the other, by all the others, why do you want me  to make a palatable grape? Our brains are dulled by the incurable mania  of wanting to make the unknown known, classifiable. The desire for  analysis wins out over the sentiments.** (Barrès, Proust.) The result is  statements of undue length whose persuasive power is attributable  solely to their strangeness and which impress the reader only by the  abstract quality of their vocabulary, which moreover is ill-defined. If  the general ideas that philosophy has thus far come up with as topics of  discussion revealed by their very nature their definitive incursion  into a broader or more general area. I would be the first to greet the  news with joy. But up till now it has been nothing but idle repartee;  the flashes of wit and other niceties vie in concealing from us the true  thought in search of itself, instead of concentrating on obtaining  successes. It seems to me that every act is its own justification, at  least for the person who has been capable of committing it, that it is  endowed with a radiant power which the slightest gloss is certain to  diminish. Because of this gloss, it even in a sense ceases to happen. It  gains nothing to be thus distinguished. Stendhal's heroes are subject  to the comments and appraisals -- appraisals which are more or less  successful -- made by that author, which add not one whit to their  glory. Where we really find them again is at the point at which Stendahl  has lost them. 
We are still living under the reign of logic: this, of course, is  what I have been driving at. But in this day and age logical methods  are applicable only to solving problems of secondary interest. The  absolute rationalism that is still in vogue allows us to consider only  facts relating directly to our experience. Logical ends, on the  contrary, escape us. It is pointless to add that experience itself has  found itself increasingly circumscribed. It paces back and forth in a  cage from which it is more and more difficult to make it emerge. It too  leans for support on what is most immediately expedient, and it is  protected by the sentinels of common sense. Under the pretense of  civilization and progress, we have managed to banish from the mind  everything that may rightly or wrongly be termed superstition, or fancy;  forbidden is any kind of search for truth which is not in conformance  with accepted practices. It was, apparently, by pure chance that a part  of our mental world which we pretended not to be concerned with any  longer -- and, in my opinion by far the most important part -- has been  brought back to light. For this we must give thanks to the discoveries  of Sigmund Freud. On the basis of these discoveries a current of opinion  is finally forming by means of which the human explorer will be able to  carry his investigation much further, authorized as he will henceforth  be not to confine himself solely to the most summary realities. The  imagination is perhaps on the point of reasserting itself, of reclaiming  its rights. If the depths of our mind contain within it strange forces  capable of augmenting those on the surface, or of waging a victorious  battle against them, there is every reason to seize them -- first to  seize them, then, if need be, to submit them to the control of our  reason. The analysts themselves have everything to gain by it. But it is  worth noting that no means has been designated a priori for carrying  out this undertaking, that until further notice it can be construed to  be the province of poets as well as scholars, and that its success is  not dependent upon the more or less capricious paths that will be  followed. 
Freud very rightly brought his critical faculties to bear upon  the dream. It is, in fact, inadmissible that this considerable portion  of psychic activity (since, at least from man's birth until his death,  thought offers no solution of continuity, the sum of the moments of the  dream, from the point of view of time, and taking into consideration  only the time of pure dreaming, that is the dreams of sleep, is not  inferior to the sum of the moments of reality, or, to be more precisely  limiting, the moments of waking) has still today been so grossly  neglected. I have always been amazed at the way an ordinary observer  lends so much more credence and attaches so much more importance to  waking events than to those occurring in dreams. It is because man, when  he ceases to sleep, is above all the plaything of his memory, and in  its normal state memory takes pleasure in weakly retracing for him the  circumstances of the dream, in stripping it of any real importance, and  in dismissing the only determinant from the point where he thinks he has  left it a few hours before: this firm hope, this concern. He is under  the impression of continuing something that is worthwhile. Thus the  dream finds itself reduced to a mere parenthesis, as is the night. And,  like the night, dreams generally contribute little to furthering our  understanding. 
This curious state of affairs seems to me to call for  certain reflections: 
1) Within the limits where they operate (or are thought to  operate) dreams give every evidence of being continuous and show signs  of organization. Memory alone arrogates to itself the right to excerpt  from dreams, to ignore the transitions, and to depict for us rather a  series of dreams than the dream itself. By the same token, at any given  moment we have only a distinct notion of realities, the coordination of  which is a question of will.* (Account must be taken of the depth of the  dream. For the most part I retain only what I can glean from its most  superficial layers. What I most enjoy contemplating about a dream is  everything that sinks back below the surface in a waking state,  everything I have forgotten about my activities in the course of the  preceding day, dark foliage, stupid branches. In "reality," likewise, I  prefer to fall.) What is worth noting is that nothing allows us to  presuppose a greater dissipation of the elements of which the dream is  constituted. I am sorry to have to speak about it according to a formula  which in principle excludes the dream. When will we have sleeping  logicians, sleeping philosophers? I would like to sleep, in order to  surrender myself to the dreamers, the way I surrender myself to those  who read me with eyes wide open; in order to stop imposing, in this  realm, the conscious rhythm of my thought. Perhaps my dream last night  follows that of the night before, and will be continued the next night,  with an exemplary strictness. It's quite possible, as the saying goes.  And since it has not been proved in the slightest that, in doing so, the  "reality" with which I am kept busy continues to exist in the state of  dream, that it does not sink back down into the immemorial, why should I  not grant to dreams what I occasionally refuse reality, that is, this  value of certainty in itself which, in its own time, is not open to my  repudiation? Why should I not expect from the sign of the dream more  than I expect from a degree of consciousness which is daily more acute?  Can't the dream also be used in solving the fundamental questions of  life? Are these questions the same in one case as in the other and, in  the dream, do these questions already exist? Is the dream any less  restrictive or punitive than the rest? I am growing old and, more than  that reality to which I believe I subject myself, it is perhaps the  dream, the difference with which I treat the dream, which makes me grow  old. 
2) Let me come back again to the waking state. I have no choice  but to consider it a phenomenon of interference. Not only does the mind  display, in this state, a strange tendency to lose its bearings (as  evidenced by the slips and mistakes the secrets of which are just  beginning to be revealed to us), but, what is more, it does not appear  that, when the mind is functioning normally, it really responds to  anything but the suggestions which come to it from the depths of that  dark night to which I commend it. However conditioned it may be, its  balance is relative. It scarcely dares express itself and, if it does,  it confines itself to verifying that such and such an idea, or such and  such a woman, has made an impression on it. What impression it would be  hard pressed to say, by which it reveals the degree of its subjectivity,  and nothing more. This idea, this woman, disturb it, they tend to make  it less severe. What they do is isolate the mind for a second from its  solvent and spirit it to heaven, as the beautiful precipitate it can be,  that it is. When all else fails, it then calls upon chance, a divinity  even more obscure than the others to whom it ascribes all its  aberrations. Who can say to me that the angle by which that idea which  affects it is offered, that what it likes in the eye of that woman is  not precisely what links it to its dream, binds it to those fundamental  facts which, through its own fault, it has lost? And if things were  different, what might it be capable of? I would like to provide it with  the key to this corridor. 
3) The mind of the man who dreams is fully satisfied by what  happens to him. The agonizing question of possibility is no longer  pertinent. Kill, fly faster, love to your heart's content. And if you  should die, are you not certain of reawaking among the dead? Let  yourself be carried along, events will not tolerate your interference.  You are nameless. The ease of everything is priceless. 
What reason, I ask, a reason so much vaster than the other, makes  dreams seem so natural and allows me to welcome unreservedly a welter  of episodes so strange that they could confound me now as I write? And  yet I can believe my eyes, my ears; this great day has arrived, this  beast has spoken. 
If man's awaking is harder, if it breaks the spell too abruptly,  it is because he has been led to make for himself too impoverished a  notion of atonement. 
4) From the moment when it is subjected to a methodical  examination, when, by means yet to be determined, we succeed in  recording the contents of dreams in their entirety (and that presupposes  a discipline of memory spanning generations; but let us nonetheless  begin by noting the most salient facts), when its graph will expand with  unparalleled volume and regularity, we may hope that the mysteries  which really are not will give way to the great Mystery. I believe in  the future resolution of these two states, dream and reality, which are  seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute reality, a  surreality, if one may so speak. It is in quest of this surreality that I  am going, certain not to find it but too unmindful of my death not to  calculate to some slight degree the joys of its possession. 
A story is told according to which Saint-Pol-Roux, in times gone  by, used to have a notice posted on the door of his manor house in  Camaret, every evening before he went to sleep, which read: THE POET IS  WORKING. 
A great deal more could be said, but in passing I merely wanted  to touch upon a subject which in itself would require a very long and  much more detailed discussion; I shall come back to it. At this  juncture, my intention was merely to mark a point by noting the hate of  the marvelous which rages in certain men, this absurdity beneath which  they try to bury it. Let us not mince words: the marvelous is always  beautiful, anything marvelous is beautiful, in fact only the marvelous  is beautiful. 
 
 
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